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ABSTRACT
Fish farming is one of the fastest growing sectors of agriculture, at-
tracting considerable attention to the question of whether existing 
farming regulations and animal welfare laws are adequate to deal 
with the expanding role of fish in feeding humans. The role of fish as 
model organisms in scientific research is also expanding—a majority 
of research biology departments now keep zebrafish for the purposes 
of genome biology, and they are used widely used for basic neuro-
science research. However, due to their diversity and distance from 
mammalian biology, fish pose difficult questions for the application 
of legal and ethical principles of animal welfare. This paper reviews 
the developing legal and scientific context in which such questions 
must be answered.
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Many people think of fish as below the “interesting” thresh-
old of cognitive complexity or sentience, and thus beyond ethi-
cal concern. The story is, however, a lot more complicated than 
it is usually made to appear. Fish present hard cases, because 
they are anatomically and neuroanatomically very different 
from us, and the functional properties of their nervous systems 
are hard to investigate (Vargas et al. 2009). Nevertheless, as I 
will describe, there is evidence of complex behavior in vari-
ous species—much more complex than the usual stereotype for 
fish—and this should make us wonder whether the right criteria 
have been applied to judgments of their lack of cognitive so-
phistication, and what the proper scientific methods for study-
ing these questions should be. 
My approach to questions of fish cognition and conscious-
ness stem mainly from my theoretical interests in philosophy 
of science and mind, where fish are particularly interesting 
because they present boundary cases. I do not approach these 
questions as an ethicist or a jurist, nor with a particular ethi-
cal agenda aimed at increasing protection for fish or expanding 
our exploitation of the for food, research, and recreation. How-
ever, it seems to me that one significant aspect of moral and 
legal progress consists in the expansion of the circle of moral 
and legal concern from the in-group, those who are presently 
included in the moral or legal community, to members of the 
current out-group. So one question to ask is whether fish are 
going to be swept up in this expansion. The expansion is hap-
pening in different ways and at different rates. Others before 
me have made the point that the law follows public opinion in 
many ways, and public opinion sometimes follows what the 
philosophers are doing. The philosophers are sometimes, in my 
view, not paying enough attention (or only selective attention) 
to science, and here I echo the title of Quintelier et al. (2011) 
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that “Normative ethics does not need a foundation: it needs 
more science.” But how might the science of fish be deployed 
in legal or ethical contexts?
There is a complex interplay internally and externally to the 
relevant sciences. Things move at different rates on different 
fronts. Attempts to understand and justify our decisions about 
whether or not the laws are adequate, or our ethical principles 
are doing the job, all must be understood against this complex 
environment. It is easy, for example, to criticize the law for 
drawing politically motivated and scientifically unjustified 
lines. The Animal Welfare Act in the United States was under 
litigation a few years ago when anti-vivisectionists sued the 
US Department of Agriculture claiming that the USDA did not 
consistently apply the regulations to all the different species 
of animals in laboratories. The response by Congress was to 
change the definition of “animal” as follows:
any live or dead dog, cat, monkey, non human or pri-
mate mammal, or other such warm-blooded animal as 
the secretary may determine is being used, or is in-
tended for use, for research, testing, experimentation, 
or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but such term (sic) 
excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus and mice 
of the genus Mus, bred for use in research, (2) horses 
not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm ani-
mals... (7 U.S.C. 54, 2009, sec. 2132)
Although the excluded species are regulated elsewhere, from 
a biologist’s point of view, this definition of animal seems ar-
bitrary. Why the exclusion? The excluded animals in clause 
(1) above comprise 95% of laboratory animals. This was Con-
gress’s response to the challenge that the law was not being 
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properly applied to laboratory animals. We might look at this 
as philosophers or biologists, and say “how irrational.” But the 
law needs to define “animal” in a way that is suitable for the 
political and social aims of the Act, not for common sense or 
for the purposes of a scientific taxonomy. We cannot criticize 
it on the grounds that “that is not what ‘animal’ means.” One 
may disagree with the political or social aims, of the Act, but 
we must understand the role of the definitions within it relative 
to its aims. Scientific considerations do, however, matter when 
it comes to the applicability of the laws and their contained 
definitions. 
To further this point, let us look at the animal welfare laws 
from a few other countries. Several of them refer to warm-
bloodedness, a point I shall return to later. The United King-
dom’s Animal Scientific Procedures Act of 1986 states, 
“a protected animal” for the purposes of this act, as any 
living vertebrate other than man, and any invertebrate 
of the species Octopus vulgaris (ASPA 1986, Chapter 
14; emphasis in original)
Again, from a biologist’s or philosopher’s point of view, the 
protection of exactly one species among the invertebrates seems 
completely arbitrary, although the 1986 law also permitted the 
UK Secretary of State to extend the definition of “protected 
animal” to include “invertebrates of any description after the 
stage of development where it becomes capable of independent 
feeding.” However, the act protected vertebrates in the fetal/
embryonic stage only during the second half of its incubation 
or gestation period, but no rationale was given for this cutoff 
point. In the more recent UK Animal Welfare Act of 2006, there 
was a slight modification of the treatment of invertebrates. The 
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2006 Act still allows the definition to be extended to include in-
vertebrates, provided that “the appropriate national authorities 
are satisfied on the basis of scientific evidence that these ani-
mals are capable of experiencing pain or suffering.” So, for the 
first time in the UK law, scientific assessment of the capability 
for pain or suffering gets explicitly into the regulations deter-
mining what may be ruled into the circle of legal protection.
In Canada’s Health of Animals Act of 1990 the definition of 
animal includes fertilized eggs or ovum. The Act illustrates the 
trend in industrialized countries towards making the prevention 
of animal pain and suffering explicit in the law, making it an 
offence by anyone who “wilfully causes, or being the owner, 
wilfully permits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering, or in-
jury to an animal or a bird” (S.C. 1990, c.21, 1/.445.1). The ex-
plicit mention of birds here might also cause interpretive ques-
tions concerning the meaning of “animal,” putting into ques-
tion whether fish would be automatically covered. A mixture of 
folk and scientific categories of animals is evident in Canada’s 
Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46) where “cattle” is defined 
as “neat cattle or an animal of the bovine species why whatever 
technical or familiar name it is known, and includes any horse, 
mule, ass, pig, sheep, or goat.” 
In Australia, animal welfare is handled at the state or terri-
tory level. The Queensland Animal Care and Protection Act of 
2001 explicitly mentions protection for live marsupial young, 
and it explicitly mentions fish. The Act also identifies protected 
species of invertebrates by using scientific taxonomic names, 
groups Cephalopoda and Malacostraca, although it mentions 
examples of each of these categories by their common names 
(octopi and squid for the former, and crabs, crayfish, lobsters, 
and prawns for the latter). Here the law has moved consider-
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ably away from folk notions of animals, handing the categories 
to a scientific taxonomy.
During 2012-2015 the European Union is engaged in a pro-
cess of revising its statutory framework for animal welfare. Al-
though it is not yet law, the European Commission’s initial re-
port to the European Parliament and related committees (COM 
2012) mentions explicitly the need to investigate questions of 
fish welfare because of the increasing trend of fish farming. The 
Commission states its intention to “continue to seek scientific 
advice on a species by species basis” in evaluating fish welfare 
issues. 
One discernible trend in this brief survey of the international 
regulatory scene is the increasing role of science not just in 
the formulation of principles but in the codification of the laws 
themselves (see also Allen 2004). This appeal to science has at 
least two fronts. On the one hand there is concern for scientific 
classification. While my earlier point still stands that politi-
cal and social reasons may allow lines to be drawn anywhere, 
nevertheless categories that are vague or based in folk notions 
of animal categories may lead to interpretive difficulties that 
legal systems should wish to avoid, and that may be avoided 
by adopting a scientific taxonomy. On the other hand there 
is concern to identify just those species that may actually be 
harmed by human actions, particular with respect to their pain 
and suffering. This raises questions of how those effects are to 
be discerned in protected species. And once again, because folk 
criteria have only limited application it is not surprising that, 
as the British law makes explicit, scientific advice should be 
sought.
Colin Allen
74
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
In a previous paper (Allen 2006), I outlined an ethics/science 
interface which can be extended for the purposes of this paper 
by putting ethics and law on the same side, science on the other. 
The interface is presented as an argumentative structure: 
1. Argue that moral/legal status depends on posses-
sion of some properties M [the “ethics premise”]
2. Assess the scientific evidence that treatment T af-
fects M in species S [the “science premise”]
3. Conclude/legislate/act accordingly for or against 
subjecting S to T
In discussions framed in this way, participants argue that moral 
or legal status depends on possessing some relevant proper-
ties, or M properties. Some examples of properties considered 
ethically relevant are the capacity for pain or suffering, the ca-
pacity to hold desires, the ability to plan for future life, etc. 
Participants to the discussion additionally assess the scientific 
evidence that some treatment of an animal affects the relevant 
property or properties one way or another. Then on the basis of 
what the scientific evidence says, they can conclude, legislate, 
or act accordingly against treating members of the species in 
the specified way. 
In this paper I am not going to be focusing on the ethics 
premise. It is to be understood that there may be multiple ethi-
cal perspectives here which are relevant to thinking about ani-
mal welfare/ethics more generally. Rather, I’m focused on the 
science premise and how assessments of the relevant M prop-
erties may be justified.
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So what is it like to be a fish? A lot of what people say about 
this is based either implicitly or explicitly on comparison to 
mammals. Rose (2002, 33) argues from the extensive role of 
frontal and parietal neocortical regions in mammalian pain bi-
ology that, “the fundamental requirements for pain/suffering 
are now known. Fishes lack the most important of these re-
quired neural structures, and they have no alternative neural 
systems for producing the pain experience. Therefore, the reac-
tions of fishes to noxious stimuli are nociceptive and without 
conscious awareness of pain.” Nociception is the term the sci-
entists use for the capacity to detect noxious stimuli that causes 
withdrawal from the stimuli, but not necessarily any conscious 
experience of it. From experiment on mammals whose spinal 
cord has been severed, it is known that one can still activate 
lower-limb withdrawal responses to noxious stimuli. With no 
connection or signal getting to the brain there is presumably no 
conscious experience associated with the peripheral nocicep-
tive circuits, but the avoidance response is still there. So the 
mere evidence that the animal withdraws a part of its body from 
something noxious is not sufficient to establish the conscious 
experience of pain. 
Victoria Braithwaite (2010) presents a contrasting view, 
where she writes that there is as much evidence for fish suffer-
ing as there is for birds or mammals. So what is the evidence? 
The numerous experiments on fish responses to noxious stimuli 
include injecting bee venom into the lips of trout. Fish treated 
in this way spent the next couple of hours rubbing their mouths 
on the bottom of the tank, eating less, and showing symptoms 
of irritation at the point of contact. The locations of nocicep-
tive sites on the rainbow trout’s head have also been identi-
fied (Sneddon et al. 2003). Thus Braithwaite and her colleagues 
claim that there is a good peripheral sensory argument and be-
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havioral evidence for the claim that fish feel pain. Still this is 
far from consensus, for at roughly the same time Cabanac and 
colleagues (Cabanac et al. 2009) argued that consciousness did 
not generally emerge in phylogeny until the amniotes some 350 
million years ago. The addition of an amniotic barrier in the 
egg frees them from laying eggs in water and allows these spe-
cies to reproduce on dry land. Cabanac et al. produce a number 
of lines of arguments for their claim based on whether or not 
there are signs of emotion, sensory pleasure, play, and sleep in 
various vertebrate groups.
I will confine myself here to a few comments about their 
claims concerning sleep and emotion (see Allen 2011 for ad-
ditional detail). Cabanac et al. claim that there is no evidence 
for sleep in fish. But Yokogawa et al. (2009) have characterized 
sleep in zebrafish, and looked at the effects of insomnia in mu-
tant forms of these fish. They found that not only do zebrafish 
go through periods similar to mammalian sleep, but they suffer 
from a rebound effect, so if you deprive them of sleep, then 
over time, they will need to make up that deficit. From this 
they conclude that sleep seems to be a real biological need for 
fish, which has real biological consequences. Cabanac (pers. 
comm.) responds that there is no evidence in fish for a REM 
(rapid eye movement) phase of sleep, which is known to be 
cognitively important in mammals. It must be conceded that 
the precise role of the sleep state in zebrafish and whether it 
serves the same function as REM sleep in mammals, remains 
to be investigated. Furthermore, zebrafish are not goldfish, so 
we must remain alert to species differences. I conclude that too 
little is known about sleep in fish to make it the basis for any 
broad claims about fish consciousness.
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To make their case against emotion in fish, Cabanac and col-
leagues experimented on goldfish, and investigated different 
ways of possibly inducing a change in body temperature in these 
fish and observing their response (Cabanac and Laberge 1998). 
Fish administered pyrogens, fever-inducing infectious agents, 
were compared to fish that were handled by the experimenters. 
They gave the fish a choice either to swim in a tank at 37˚ C or 
in one at 34˚ C. The idea is that if their body temperatures are 
raised, they should prefer the cooler tank. The pyrogen-treated 
fish preferred the cooler tank. The handled fish showed no pref-
erence. Cabanac concludes that unlike mammals and birds, the 
stress of handling does not induce “emotional fever,” i.e. raised 
body temperature in response to acutely stressful experiences, 
and this indicates to him that they do not experience emotions 
at all. 
A worry about this conclusion is that one might not expect an 
ectothermic (cold-blooded) organism to have the same thermo-
regulatory responses as an endothermic (warm-blooded) organ-
ism, particularly if body heating in response to acute stress in 
terrestrial animals is part of a flight response in red muscle tis-
sue whereas white fish muscle is less dependent on blood sup-
ply for fast response. One might also worry that learning from 
prior experience of handling by the goldfish used in Cabanac’s 
experiment could also play a role in their responses. Goldfish, 
however, have a reputation for being particularly unable to re-
tain learned information, a reputation that is encapsulated in the 
common trope of a 3-second memory. Nevertheless, according 
to both Mythbusters (season 2, episode 11, first aired January 
25, 2004) and an Australian schoolboy’s science fair project 
(widely reported in news media in February 2008), the 3-sec-
ond memory is a myth—goldfish can retain learned responses 
over much longer time spans. Of course, these tests were not 
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subject to scientific peer review. In the scientific literature, Bit-
terman (1975) compared goldfish to monkeys on a task where 
the animals could feed at one of two locations, and he varied 
the amount of success at those locations. In the situation where 
the food reward schedule was for 70% of the approaches to one 
station and 30% of approaches to the other, goldfish appeared 
to match, meaning they went to the 70% station roughly 70% of 
the time, which gets them a reward 49% of the time, and they 
go to the other station 30% of the time, so they get a reward 9% 
of the time, for an overall success rate of 58%. The monkeys in 
Bitterman’s experiment went to the higher return station almost 
all the time, and thus received the food reward almost 70% of 
the time. So, monkeys look smarter (being better rational opti-
mizers) in this experiment.
Here then, is where perhaps the bad reputation of the gold-
fish got consolidated. But we should not be so hasty to general-
ize to all fish, and perhaps not even to all goldfish. Kotrschal 
and Taborsky (2010) studied the development of learning abili-
ties in a ciclid fish, from a genus of African freshwater fish. In 
their experiment, the fish were kept during the first year of their 
lives in one of four conditions: they either received the same 
low food ration every day, the same high level ration, or they 
experienced one change in the food ration during that first year, 
either from low to high or high to low. The fish were then kept 
for a couple of months during which they received enough food 
to equalize average body weights across the four groups, before 
being given a learning test. Kotrschal and Taborsky and found 
that the fish who had experienced the single feeding change, 
whether low to high or high to low, performed much better than 
the fish with the constant feeding schedule, even though that 
change had been experienced months before. If just one small 
change in experience can affect learning abilities of goldfish, 
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it is salutary to think about how the standard laboratory con-
ditions for the goldfish in Bitterman’s study could have made 
considerable difference to the outcome of that experiment.
I have been hinting that we should also pay attention to the 
differences among fish species. The category of “fish” is actu-
ally not a very well defined taxonomic category from a biologi-
cal perspective, because not all the descendants of fish are fish 
(mammals and birds being descended from the Sarcopterygii, 
or lobe-finned fishes). To use the biological jargon, fish do not 
comprise a monophyletic clade. It is somewhat sobering to re-
alize that we humans are more closely related to coelacanths 
than coelacanths are to tuna or goldfish, and sharks and rays 
are also off on different branch from the groups containing any 
of the species mentioned so far. Setting aside the classificatory 
worries, there are 31,500 known species of fish, comprising of 
60% of all vertebrates, and that number continues to grow as 
new species are discovered. These species vary enormously. 
There are ectothermic, cold-blooded fish and endothermic, 
warm-blooded fish. Tuna maintain body temperatures much 
higher than ambient, and swordfish can maintain brain and eye 
temperatures above the ambient temperature. They have enor-
mously different breeding systems. Some lay eggs, some ges-
tate eggs internally, some have a protoplacental arrangement. 
In light of this variation, to generalize about fish is irrespon-
sible. And when we get to neuroanatomical studies, there is just 
as much diversity of form and function. To take goldfish or 
zebrafish as models for all fish is highly problematic.
The behavior of fish is also highly diverse and in many cases 
more complex than typically recognized (see Allen 2011 for 
review). For example, Bshary et al. (2006) have documented 
repeated instances of cooperative hunting between a grouper 
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and a moray eel in the Red Sea. The grouper approaches the 
moray’s lair, does a head shake, and the eel follows the grouper 
to a hole where a prey fish is hiding. The moray goes into the 
hole, flushing the fish out. If the prey gets away, the grouper 
chases it until the prey hides under the reef, then comes back to 
the moray to lead the eel to the new refuge of the prey. Bshary 
et al. observed a 50% distribution of the prey catches between 
the grouper and the moray. 
But what has complex behavior to do with ethically or le-
gally relevant properties, which I have been referring to as the 
“M” properties? A key issue here concerns how to link cogni-
tive and behavioral complexity to conscious experience. In a 
previous paper on animal pain (Allen 2004), I argued that an 
answer to this challenge might involve a substantive theory of 
the function of consciousness, and I suggested that attention to 
learning, particularly a fine-grained analysis of different kinds 
of learning, could help. There are several accounts of the func-
tion of consciousness that reject the epiphenomenalist view 
that consciousness is causally and functionally inert. Some of 
the non-epiphenomenalist theories attribute more simple func-
tions, other more complex ones. Learning is in the middle of 
this range, and here is one illustration of why I think a fine-
grained analysis of different learning types should be of inter-
est. 
In standard Pavlovian “delay” conditioning, a new stimu-
lus is presented (think of Pavlov’s bell) and while it is present 
(ringing) the old (unconditioned) stimulus is also presented. 
Eventually, the animal starts responding to the new (condi-
tioned) stimulus just as it did to the old (unconditioned) stim-
ulus—e.g. by salivating when the bell rings in Pavlov’s case. 
A second form of conditioning, “trace conditioning,” is very 
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similar except that the new stimulus (the CS) is removed or 
stopped before the unconditioned stimulus (US) is presented. 
For instance, the bell stops ringing before the food appears. 
Some animals under some conditions will nevertheless learn 
to respond appropriately to CS in a delay condition. Clark and 
Squire (1998) published a comparative study of humans and 
rabbits involved in both trace and delay conditioning. In their 
experiment, the US was a puff of air directed towards the eye, 
the CS was an audible tone, and the unconditioned response is 
an eye-blink. In the delay condition the puff of air comes while 
the tone is still audible, and in the trace condition it comes after 
the tone has ended. In Clark and Squire’s experiments, every 
subject, rabbit or human, acquired the eye-blink response to the 
tone in the standard Pavlovian delay conditioning procedure. 
But in the trace conditioning procedure only about half the 
people and half the rabbits acquired the response. The human 
subjects were debriefed, and of those in the delay conditioning 
group, only about half showed any knowledge that there was a 
relationship between the tone and the puff of air, but in the trace 
conditioning group all and only those subjects who acquired 
the response were able to report noticing that the puff of air 
was preceded by the tone. Here we have a correlation between 
the occurrence of conscious awareness of a relationship among 
stimuli and one particular kind of learning, but not another. Fur-
thermore, I argued (Allen 2004) that this relationship ties into 
some plausible theories about the function of consciousness, 
specifically in connection with working memory or a “global 
workspace” (Baars 1997). I do not mean to suggest that this 
is the only kind of learning worth investigating—elsewhere I 
have argued that place preference conditioning is another im-
portant tool (Allen et al. 2005). The point is just that a scientific 
approach to assessment of conscious pain has more potential 
avenues of investigation than is often realized.
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In context of fish welfare and fish agriculture, this turns out 
to be very interesting. Cod, halibut, and trout are among some 
of the most commonly farmed species, and it seems that the 
ecology of these animals makes a huge difference to trace con-
ditioning. Trace conditioning is also important from the agri-
cultural perspective since giving fish a cue that they are about 
to be fed can greatly decrease the amount of food that is wasted. 
Initially, biologists struggled to show that halibut were capable 
of trace conditioning, whereas it was relatively easy to dem-
onstrate in cod and trout (Nilsson et al. 2008; Nordgreen et al. 
2010). However, halibut are sit-and-wait ambush predators, so 
it does not behoove them to start moving as soon as they get a 
cue that food is nearby. They must wait for the prey to approach 
within striking distance. Once the importance of a long delay 
was recognized, trace conditioning was indeed found (Nilsson 
et al. 2010). Trace conditioning is also an important tool for 
investigating homology between fish brains and those of other 
vertebrates (Vargas et al. 2009).
In this paper I have pointed out some trends in ethics, ex-
panding circles of inclusion, the law, replacement of folk cat-
egories and concepts with explicit appeal to science, and in the 
sciences of more sophisticated techniques for species-specific 
assessments. However, despite the fact that the sciences are 
presenting ever richer information about fish, there remains no 
clear consensus about their capacities for cognition and con-
sciousness. This lack of consensus is potentially confounding 
to ethicists and legislators, and it leaves the ethicists in particu-
lar with a dilemma. On the one hand, law and science call for 
more reliance on scientific research, but on the other hand, the 
very kind of research to figure out what fish may learn from 
things such as painful stimuli is potentially objectionable re-
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search that may need to be carried out on almost a species-by-
species basis.
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